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Abstract Pressure relief device (PRD) serves to control and limit the pressure by directing the flow into an additional 
path. In the process of purification of oil and gas, application of PRD is found in production gas separator system. However, 
based on API 581, the PRD also has a risk of failure that every oil and gas company need to conduct regular inspections to 
ensure the reliability of PRD. One approach to evaluate critically the PRDs for arranging and scheduling programs is to use 
the risk-based inspection (RBI) method. The RBI is a systematic approach to the method of inspection management of 
equipment or works unit based on the level of risk. Risk assessment for PRD is based on API RP 581 third edition. After 
knowing the level of risk for PRD, the risk needs to be evaluated. For acceptable risk, it can be used as a reference to 
determine the next inspection until risk target. Meanwhile, unacceptable risk should be inspected immediately after RBI 
analysis. 
Keywords failure, inspection management, purification, reliability, risk assessment, risk target. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Safety is a main point to be fulfilled in petroleum 
and gas company production. Safety becomes a main 
point because the characteristics of oil and gas itself 
that operated in high pressure and flammable 
environment. If there is any failure may affect to 
human, environment, and operation of production, one 
of the method that may reduce the failure because of 
high pressure is installed the safety device which is the 
application of Pressure Relief Device (PRD) [1]. PRD 
is a safety device that works for control and limit 
pressure by directing the flow of high pressure from 
the main system into system itself [2]. 
Pressure relief device may fail for release the over 
pressure can cause failure on a protected device. 
Based on America Petroleum Institute Recommended 
Practice 581, there are 2 models for failure in PRD 
[3]: 
- Fail to Open (FAIL) 
a. Stuck or fail to open (FTO) 
b. Device partially open (DPO) 
c. Opens above set pressure (OASP) 
- Leakage Failure ( LEAK) 
a. Leak past device (LPD) 
b. Spurious/premature opening (SPO) 
c. Device stuck open (DSO) 
Due to the high risk of failure of PRD, the 
government regulation no. 11 1979 regulates the 
safety of work on the processing of oil and gas. After 
the probability and consequences of failure. In chapter 
IV, article 14 and 15 discusses about the use and 
inspection programs to undertaken to prevent possible 
problems that may occurred during petroleum 
processing. This regulation shall bind any company 
engaged in the oil and gas processing industry shall 
conduct inspections on any equipment owned 
including the PRD [4]. This is useful to ensure success 
and safety in the work area. Each company has its own 
program and scheduling inspection of the company's 
assets. However, there are times when the inspection 
program that they apply is not maximized so that they 
are looking for an appropriate and effective inspection 
method to reduce the cost of inspection and 
maintenance [5]. 
Furthermore, to evaluate and scheduling programs 
analysis for PRD, then the risk-based inspection (RBI) 
method is used in this research.  
II. METHOD 
Risk assessment is calculated by combining the 
probability of failure with the consequences of failure. 
The first step in this RBI study is to calculate the 
probability of fail to open and the probability of Leak 
[6]. 
The next step after the probability of failure is to 
calculate the consequences of failure. The 
consequences of failure are influenced by the size of 
the release hole, the discharge rate or the release mass, 
the detection and isolation system, etc. 
After the probabilities and consequences of failure 
are obtained, then the risk can be calculated using 
RBI. The risk is then compared with the target risk, 
and the RBI assessment. RBI assessment is conducted 
to determine the inspection schedule and the 
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appropriate inspection method for pressure vessel. 
Details of RBI work for PRD are shown in Figure 1. 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
A. Probability of Fail (Fail) 
The fundamental calculation applied to the PRD 
for the case of failure to open is to estimate the 
overpressure demand case frequency (or demand 
level), PRD probability fails to open when needed, and 
the probability that the protected equipment under 
excess pressure will experience loss containment. So 
the equation (1) can be made [3]. 
 
.  (1) 
 
The j notation needs to be calculated for each of 
the possible excessive pressures that occur in relation 
to the PRD. Pf, j, is a function of time and the 
potential for excess pressure. 
PRD Demand Rate is obtained by multiplying 
default initiating event frequencies and demand rate 
reduction factor as shown in equation (2). Default 
initiating event frequency and demand rate reduction 
factor are found in Table 7.2 API 581. 
 
.  (2) 
 
PRD Probability of Failure on Demand is the 
probability of PRD will fail to open when needed. API 
581 provides default failure on the failure on demand 
rate developed from the industrial data. This default 
value is expressed as a Weibull curve modified by 
several factors to obtain the equation (3). 
 
=1-exp  (3) 
 
Where : 
t = time for inspection interval 
η,β = weibull parameters 
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Figure 1. PRD RBI Methodology 
(Source : API RP 581) 
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The probability of protected equipment under 
excess pressure will have loss containment adjusted to 
the generic failure frequency of equipment multiplied 
by DF (damage factor). DF is determined based on the 
damage mechanism applicable to maintenance, 
inspection history, and equipment condition. Damage 
Factor on protected equipment is calculated as a 
function of time. 
Damage adjusted to the failure frequency is 
calculated at the normal operating pressure of the 
equipment and adjusted when evaluating the PRD. 
When PRD fails, it fails to open when needed. 
Pressure in protected equipment rises above operating 
pressure and in most cases significantly above MAWP 
(maximum allowable working pressure). Damage 
adjusted to the frequency of failure, which equals to 
the probability of loss of containment of the protected 
equipment under overpressure is calculated as the 
following equation (4): 
 (4) 
 
From the analyzed PRD obtained the probability of 
Fail to open results as in table 1. 
 
TABLE 1.  
PRD PROBABILITY CALCULATION RESULTS ON PRODUCTION GAS SEPARATOR FAILED TO OPEN 
PRD   
(failure/ demand) 
  
(demand/ year) 
  
(failure/ year) 
  
(failure/ year) 
PSV-0001A 0.01025 0.0104 4.448E-06 4.76E-10 
PSV-1101A/B/C 0.01465 0.0104 1.401E-04 2.136E-08 
PSV-1102A 0.01465 0.0104 1.975E-04 3.01E-08 
PSV-1105A/B 0.01465 0.0104 2.042E-04 3.112E-08 
 
B. Probability of Leak (POL) 
The leakage case differs from the case of failure to 
open because POF is not a function of demand level 
that is not based on failure during continuous 
operation. Industrial Data Associated with leakage 
probability data in units per year (failure/year). There 
is no connection between any requests required. So the 
equation for calculating the probability of leak is 
shown in equation (5). 
=  (5) 
 
The probability of leak in the PRD is a probability 
of PRD to fail because there is a leak in the previous 
equipment. API 581 provides default on leak rates 
developed from industrial data. This default value is 
expressed as a Weibull curve modified by several 
factors such as the type of PRD soft seats and 
environmental factors. So that equation (6) is 
obtained. 
=1-exp  (6) 
 
The probability of a PRD leak needs to be adjusted 
according to the operating system adjacent to the set 
pressure as in (5). Set pressure factor, Fset is adjusted 
to PRD type provided API 581. The result of 
probability of Leak is shown in table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. 
 RESULTS OF PROBABILITY OF LEAK PRD CALCULATION ON PRODUCTION GAS SEPARATOR. 
PRD  (failure/ year)   (failure/ year) 
PSV-0001A 0.0182 0.7863 0.0143 
PSV-1101A/B/C 0.0182 0.7863 0.0143 
PSV-1102A 0.0182 0.7735 0.0141 
PSV-1105A/B 0.0182 0.7692 0.0140 
C. Consequence of Failure 
A consequent analysis is performed to determine 
the impact of a risk if it occurs on an equipment. The 
consequent analysis of the Central Processing Plant 
(CPP) uses a well-impacted area approach in the form 
of a large burning area, a large area of heat radiation 
that affects humans, and the area of toxic impact. 
In the calculation of the consequence analysis of 
the failure of PRD based on API 581 begins by 
determining the value of overpressure when there is a 
failure in place of the operating pressure, Poj. Then 
the consequence of failure is calculated by using the 
following equation (7): 
 (7) 
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where: 
 = Consequence area component damage 
(ft2 
 = consequence area personal injury (ft2) 
The consequence value of component damage area 
is calculated by using equation (8) below: 
 (8) 
Where : 
= Consequence area flammable/explosion 
(ft2) 
 =   Consequence area toxic (ft2) 
= Consequence area non-toxic non-
flammable (ft2) 
Then for consequence area personal injury with 
following equation (9): 
  (9)       
Where : 
 
 = Consequence area 
flammable/explosion (ft2) 
      =   Consequence area toxic (ft2) 
  =  Consequence area non-toxic non-
flammable(ft2) 
API 581 generally provides 2 categories of 
consequences, namely the consequences of component 
damage areas and injure personnel. The consequence 
of the area is strongly influenced by the mass of fluid 
and operating pressure contained in the RBI protected 
equipment. 
Summary of calculation of area consequences for 
pressure relief device is shown in table 3, table 4 and 
table 5. 
TABLE 3. 
CALCULATION RESULT THE CONSEQUENCE OF COMPONENT DAMAGE AREA 
PRD  (m2)  (m
2)  (m2)  (m2) 
PSV-0001A 16.895 - - 16.895 
PSV-1101A/B/C 17.277 - - 17.277 
PSV-1102A 16.8228 - - 18.8228 
PSV-1105A/B 16.8828 - - 18.8228 
 
TABLE 4. 
CALCULATION RESULT THE CONSEQUENCE OF INJURY PERSONNEL AREA 
PRD  (m2)  (m2)  (m2)  (m2) 
PSV-0001A 32.553 0.04834 0 32.553 
PSV-1101A/B/C 33.291 0.0483 0 33.291 
PSV-1102A 32.4146 0.04834 0 32.415 
PSV-1105A/B 32.4146 0.0487 0 32.415 
TABLE 5. 
FINAL CALCULATION RESULT OF CONSEQUENCE AREA OF PRD 
PRD 
 (m2)  (m2)  
PSV-0001A 16.895 32.553 32.553 
PSV-1101A/B/C 17.277 33.291 33.291 
PSV-1102A 18.8228 32.415 32.415 
PSV-1105A/B 18.8228 32.415 32.415 
 
D. Risk Assessment 
A risk is calculated under RBI plan date 
conditions. API 581 provides the risk calculated using 
the following equation (10) [9][10]. 
   (10) 
 
Where: 
PoF : Probability of Failure 
CoF : Consequence of failure 
The risk level at the pressure relief device is 
calculated by comparing the results of risk 
calculations on the RBI date and plan date with the 
risk target [3]. 
The risk ratio of each PRD analyzed is shown in 
the following table 6. 
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TABLE 6.  
PRD RISK CALCULATION RESULT 
PRD RBI date (m2/ year) plan date (m2/year) 
PSV-0001A 0.46527 4.5988 
PSV-1101A/B/C 0.4758 4.703 
PSV-1102A 0.4557 4.5045 
PSV-1105A/B 0.4532 4.4796 
 
Mapping Probability and Consequence values to a 
risk matrix is an effective method for presenting risks 
graphically. API 581 provides a relationship between 
the probability of failure and area-based consequence 
of failure as shown in table 7 
 
TABLE 7.  
NUMERICAL VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH POF AND AREA-BASED COF CATEGORIES 
Probability Category Consequence Category 
Category Probability Range Category Range (m2) 
1 Pf  (t, I E ) ≤  3.06E − 05 A CA ≤ 9.29 
2 3.06E − 05 < Pf  (t, I E ) ≤  3.06E − 04 B 9.29 < CA ≤ 92.9 
3 3.06E − 04 < Pf  (t, I E ) ≤ 3.06E − 03 C 92.9 < CA ≤ 929 
4 3.06E − 03 < Pf  (t, I E ) ≤  3.06E − 02 D 929 < CA ≤ 9, 2 90 
5 Pf  (t, I E ) >  3.06E − 02 E CA > 9,290 
 
E. Determining the risk level 
API 581 provides risk level categories into low 
risk, medium risk, medium high risk and high risk 
categories. Levels of risk gained with combines the 
probability of failure with consequences [6]. 
The probability of PRD failure analyzed ranged 
from 0.00140 failure/year - 0.00143 failure/year, so 
that based on Table 7 it can be seen that the PRD 
probability category is 4. 
While the consequences of the PRD analyzed 
ranged from 32.41 m2 - 33.291 m2, so the 
consequence category of failure is B. Figure 8 shows 
the current level of risk experienced by the PRD. From 
the risk of PRD failure plotted in with the risk matrix, 
the risk level of PRD is the medium risk. 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 8. Current risk Level (Source : API RP 581) 
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Figure. 9 . Comparison curve of approximation risk and risk target 
 
F. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) 
Assessment of RBI is done by comparing the total 
of risk at the time of RBI date and Plan date with the 
total of risk target to get target date. The target date is 
obtained by simulating the PRD life after RBI date to 
exceed the risk target so that the risk curve 
intersection on RBI date with the target risk curve is 
obtained. The curve in Figure 9 shows the comparison 
between the RBI date and the target date. 
The target date can be calculated by interpolating 
the values in table 8 using the following equation (11): 
 
TABLE 8.  
INSPECTION DATE CALCULATION 
Data Date 
Time since RBI 
Assessment (years) 
Risk Area (m2) 
RBI Date 8/25/2018 0 0.46527 
Risk Target ? ? 3.71 
Plan Date 8/25/2033 15 4.5988 
    
  (11) 
  
Y = 11.77 
 
So the target date is 11.77 years after the RBI date 
is done. 
The total value after the inspection can be 
calculated by updating the value of modified 
characteristic life, . 
This study is expected to be examined by the 
effectiveness of a minimum inspection by Category C 
inspection 2 times prior to Inspection date 
Inspection effectiveness category 2C = 1B 
(inspection by type C with scale 2 times proportional 
to inspection once using type B) and a risk of 3.07 m2 
/ year (acceptable). 
 
G. Inspection Plan 
Inspection effectiveness category C is visual test. 
Based on API 576 a full, visual on stream inspection 
should ensure the following [8]: 
1. The Correct relief device is installed. 
2. The company identification (such as a tag or 
stencil) provides means to establish the last test 
date and proper pressure setting for the 
equipment protected by the identified device. 
3. That information matches the equipment file 
records and established test interval has not been 
exceeded. 
4. No gags, blinds, closed valves, or piping 
obstructions would prevent the devices from 
functioning properly. 
5. Seals installed to protect the spring setting and 
ring pin setting have not been broken. 
6. The relief device does not leak. PRD has opened 
in service frequently leak. Detection and 
correction of this leakage eliminates product 
loss and possible pollution and prevents fouling 
and subsequent sticking of the valve. If the valve 
is a bellows valve, the bellows vent should be 
checked for leakage. 
7. Bellows vents are open and clear, and the 
connected piping is routed to a safe location. A 
“safe location” could mean to atmosphere. 
8. Upstream and downstream block valves are sealed 
or chained and locked in the proper position. 
Devices that ensure that a block valve is in its 
proper position include locking plastic bands, car 
seals, chains and padlocks, and special locking 
devices made especially for certain types of 
block valves. The field conditions should mirror 
the applicable piping and instrumentation 
diagrams (P&IDs).  
9. Vent stacks, discharge piping and small nipples 
are properly supported to avoid breakage or 
leakage. Inadequately supported or anchored 
nipples can be damaged during maintenance and 
by vibration. 
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10. Valve body drains and vent stack drains are 
open. 
11. Any lifting lever is operable and positioned 
properly. 
12. Any heat tracing, insulation, or purge that is 
critical to the proper operation of the relief 
system is intact and operating properly. 
13. A gauge installed as part of a combination of a 
rupture disk and a PRD or a device for 
checking pressure between a PRD and a block 
valve is serviceable. Verify that there is no 
pressure buildup between the rupture disk and 
pressure-relief valve. 
14. Any rupture disk is properly oriented. 
Although the interval selected for on-stream 
inspection should vary with circumstances and 
experience, a visual inspection that includes a 
check for leakage and vibration damage should 
follow each operation of a pressure-relief valve. 
Operating personnel assigned to the process unit 
may make these inspections provided that they are 
experienced to recognize any leakage or vibration 
damage. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
According to the analysis research of PRD using 
RBI API 581 Method, then some conclusion could be 
taken as explain below:  
1. The risk on PSV-0001A, PSV-1101A / B / C, 
PSV-1102A, PSV-1105A / B ranges from 0.4532 
m2 / year - 0.4758 m2 / year. The risk for all PRDs 
analyzed when incorporated into the risk matrix 
has medium risk category and it is an acceptable 
level of risk. 
2. Inspection planning for pressure relief device: 
a. PSV-0001A is estimated in the 11th year after 
RBI analysis, on October 9, 2030 
b. PSV-1101A / B / C is estimated in the 11th 
year after RBI analysis, on February 11, 2030 
c. PSV-1102A is estimated in the 11th year after 
RBI analysis, which is September 11, 2030 
d. PSV-110A / B is estimated in the 11th year 
after RBI analysis, which is October 9,2030 
3. The inspection method that is expected to be 
applied is the visual inspection done without a pop 
test, where detailed documentation of PRD internal 
component condition is performed. 
4. The calculation result using the RBI method shows 
the time of inspection for the PRD which is longer 
than the provisions of PERMEN ESDM No. 38 
2017, every 4 years. The different schedule of 
inspections can be caused by incomplete data. 
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